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Introduction
Some argue that the world is becoming more polarized (Sunstein 2009 , Brooks 2012 ). Consider, for instance, Americans' views on global warming. In a 2003 Gallup poll, 68 percent of self-identified Democrats believed that temperature changes over the past century could be attributed to human activity, relative to 52 percent of Republicans (Saad 2013) . By 2013, these percentages had diverged to 78 percent and 39 percent. 1 In a similar vein, there were large racial differences in reactions to the O.J. Simpson murder trial. Four days after the verdict was announced, 73 percent of whites but only 27 percent of blacks surveyed in a Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll believed that Simpson was guilty of murdering Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman (Urschel 1995) .
Psychologists have long recognized humans' propensity to over-interpret evidence that reinforces their beliefs while disregarding contradictory information.
2 A particularly striking example is Darley and Gross (1983) . Subjects in their experiment are asked to grade an essay written by a fictional student. Before reading the essay, however, graders view one of two videos of the student playing in his or her home. The first video shows the student in a poor, inner-city neighborhood, while the second depicts a middle-class suburban environment. Subjects shown the first video give the essay significantly lower grades. However, a subset of each group was also shown an identical video of the student in class, providing both correct and incorrect answers to a teacher's questions. Respondents who saw this second video diverged even further in their grading of the essay. Subjects who viewed the low-quality (high-quality) neighborhood and the class video gave the essay a lower (higher) grade than those who just saw the neighborhood video. The showing of the same video to the subjects caused them to further diverge in their grades. The importance of polarizing beliefs in part derives from the conflict they induce. In influential papers, Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004) derive measures of societal polarization and methods to estimate them. 3 Later work has linked increased polarization to conflict both theoretically (Esteban and Ray 2011) and empirically (Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2013) . These papers motivate understanding the mechanisms that can lead opinions to diverge even in the face of common information, since such divergence can result in society-level disruptions, intolerance, and discrimination. In this paper, we introduce a model that provides a simple foundation for why the abovedescribed polarizations in beliefs should be observed from rational agents. In our model, agents interpret information according to Bayes' rule as it is received and store the interpreted signal in memory rather than the full information, and this simple modification of Bayesian updating can lead to increasing and extreme polarization. In particular, there are two possible states of nature A, B and an agent observes a series of signals a, b that are correlated with the state of nature. Some of the signals are ambiguous and come as ab and must be interpreted. The difference from standard Bayesian agents with unbounded memory, is that we assume that an agent does not store a sequence such as a, b, ab, ab, a, ab, b, b . . . in memory, but, due to limited memory, interprets the ab signals as they are seen according to Bayes' rule (or some other rule), and then stores the interpretation in memory. So, if the agent started by believing that A was more likely, then the sequence would be interpreted and stored in memory as a, b, a, a, a, a, b, b . . .. By storing the full ambiguous sequence a, b, ab, ab, a, ab, b, b . . . the agent would actually see more evidence for b than a, while interpreting signals according to Bayes' rule as they are received and then storing the interpretation leads to a, b, a, a, a, a, b, b . . . and more evidence for a than b.
This can lead people with slightly different priors to end up with increasingly different posteriors and they interpret the same string of ab's very differently, which then reinforces their differences in beliefs. As we show, if a nontrivial fraction of experiences are open to interpretation, then two agents who have differing priors and who see exactly the same sequence of evidence can, with positive probability, end up polarized with one agent's posterior tending to place probability one on A and the other tending to place probability one on B.
With the lens of our model, the two neighborhood videos in Darley and Gross (1983) created different priors on the students' ability. This then affected the way that respondents interpreted the second video of students answering questions. A student with a lower prior on the talent of the student would put more emphasis on the incorrect answers in the second video, and a student with a higher prior would put more emphasis on the correct answers. This then leads to the observed polarization of beliefs when grading the essays. Bayes' rule with unbounded memory would predict the opposite -seeing the same second video should lead beliefs to get closer if anything. With respect to the O.J. Simpson murder trial, people interpreted the same trial as either another example of an unfair legal system or another example of murder. The data are open to interpretation, and based on their differing past experiences and beliefs prior to the trial people reached different conclusions.
The deviation of our model from fully Bayesian updating is minimal: Bayes' rule is still used at all steps and agents are rational, they are simply constrained by limited memory and must interpret ambiguous signals before storing them and then base their posteriors on the memories rather than all of the original data. Some of our results examine optimal ways to interpret ambiguous signals. We show that the rule above, based on iterative use of Bayes' rule is optimal if the agent is not too patient, and so cares enough about making correct decisions in the short run (or else begins with a strong prior). In contrast, if the agent is very patient, then the agent may wish to randomize interpretations and may do so in a manner that depends on the current belief.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 describes a framework for updating beliefs when evidence is unclear and section 4 uses this insight to understand potential mechanisms that drive polarization. The final section concludes. An appendix contains the proofs of all formal results as well as additional technical details.
A Brief Review of the Literature
Rabin and Schrag (1999) provide a first decision-making model of confirmation bias. 4 In each period agents observe a noisy signal about the state of the world, at which point they update their beliefs. Agents' perceptions are clouded by bias. In their model, signals that are believed to be less likely are misinterpreted with an exogenous probability. Given the exogenous mistakes introduced into the model, agents can converge to incorrect beliefs if they misinterpret contradictory evidence sufficiently frequently. The model does not clarify the mechanism behind the misinterpretation. Our model provides a foundation for the interpretation and storage of ambiguous information that can be thought of as providing a "why" behind the polarization.
In an important paper, Hellman and Cover (1970) introduced a model of limited memory that provides insight into how restrictions on the updating process motivated by the psychology literature can yield biases in beliefs (see also Wilson (2003) , Mullainathan (2002) , Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) , and Glaeser and Sunstein (2013) ). Agents are endowed with a finite number of "memory states," and the updating process is a set of rules for how to transition between states after observing a period's signal. The agent's goal is to know the correct state of the world when the sequence randomly terminates. The optimal transition rule turns out to be fairly simple. First, agents rank their memory states from 1 to N , with higher numbers indicating an increased likelihood that the "good" state of the world is correct. Following a good (bad) signal, the agent shifts to the next higher (lower) state until she reaches one of the extremes states (n = 1 or n = N ). Hellman and Cover show that optimizing agents with sufficient patience (probability of continuation) will leave the extreme state with very low probability. Thus, with some probability, agents will reach a state in which they ignore large amounts of seemingly contradictory information. As Wilson (2003) points out, this can yield polarization under several scenarios. For instance, two people who receive the same set of signals but start at different memory states can end up in different places for long periods of time, as they can get temporarily "stuck" at one of the extreme states. More generally, Wilson proves that as long as agents do not have identical priors and do not start at one of the extreme states, their beliefs can differ for long periods of time with positive probability.
Baliga, Hanany and Klibanoff (2013) provide a very different explanation for polarization based on ambiguity aversion. In their model, agents with different prior beliefs may update in different directions after observing some intermediate signals due to a "hedging effect" -as agents wish to make predictions that are immune to uncertainty, and they may be averse to different directions of ambiguity given their differing priors.
Our model is based on a completely orthogonal approach to both of those above. Importantly, ours is the first model providing foundations for increasing, extreme, and permanent polarization even when agents observe a common sequence of information that would lead a fully rational Bayesian agent to an arbitrarily accurate posterior. In Hellman and Cover's model, as detailed by Wilson (2003) , beliefs are ergodic: agents follow a similar irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain, simply starting in different states, and their limiting distributions would coincide. In the Baliga, Hanany and Klibanoff model, with increasing information over time, agents' posteriors would eventually become closer as they become increasingly certain of the state. In our model, agents become increasingly polarized and increasingly certain that they are each correct despite their disagreement, after seeing arbitrarily informative sequences. Thus, our results are quite complementary to those based on models of finite memory or ambiguity aversion. The simplicity and transparency of our model mean that it is also easily extendable to alternative settings.
A Model of Updating Beliefs when Experiences are Open to Interpretation
There are two possible states of nature: ω ∈ {A, B}.
An agent observes a sequence of signals, s t , one at each date t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. The signals lie in the set {a, b, ab}. A signal a is evidence that the state is A, a signal b is evidence that the state is B, and the signals ab are ambiguous and open to interpretation.
In particular, signals are independent over time, conditional upon the state. With a probability π < 1 the signal is s t = ab independent of the state. With probability 1 − π the signal s t is either a or b. If the state is ω = A and the signal is not ab, then the probability that s t = a is p > 1/2. Likewise, if the state is ω = B and the signal is not ab, then the probability that s t = b is p > 1/2.
For example, A might be a world with many racists and B a world with few racists. In A a fraction p > 1/2 of interactions are racist, while in state B a fraction p > 1/2 of interactions are non-racist. Or it might be that there are a sequence of studies regarding the impact of climate change or the efficacy of the death penalty that come out, p of which are valid and 1 − p of which are corrupt or flawed in state A and the reverse in state B.
λ 0 ∈ (0, 1) is the agent's prior that ω = A. Throughout our analysis we assume that the prior, λ 0 , is not 0 or 1, as otherwise learning is precluded. Similarly, we maintain the assumption that π < 1 as otherwise no information is ever revealed.
It follows directly from a standard law of large numbers argument (e.g., Doob's (1949) consistency theorem), that the agent's posterior beliefs converge to place weight one on the true state ω almost surely.
Observation 1 A Bayesian-updating agent who forms beliefs conditional upon the full sequence of signals observed through each time has a posterior that converges to place probability 1 on the correct state almost surely.
The signals ab are uninformative as they occur with a frequency π regardless of the state. Thus, a Bayesian updater who remembers all of the signals in their entirety effectively ignores interactions that are open to interpretation.
Interpreting Signals and Limited Memory
An important aspect of the example described in the introduction is that agents have limited memory. Otherwise, there would be no need to interpret signals -agents would store the full "scene" of every interaction in memory and be fully Bayesian.
A key element of our model is that at each date an agent can only store one bit of data. When the agent sees an ambiguous signal s t = ab, the agent must interpret and store it as either a or b. An agent has limited memory and cannot remember all the possible interpretations of all social interactions and thus, must store in memory a strict subset of the information involved in the social interaction. The interpretation of ambiguous signals s t = ab as clear signals a or b is based on the agent's experiences through time t.
Our limited memory assumption warrants some discussion. In a world with unlimited memory, agents would store an nxt matrix -n arbitrarily large and t growing with time -where the first dimension n captures the complexity of the signal in terms of "bytes" (a, b, ab, . . .) and the t dimension captures how many experiences she has stored. Our model reduces this matrix to 1xt, making the signal agents are able to store one byte of the data but still allowing the sequence of bytes to be arbitrarily long. If we were to make agents have limited memory on both dimensions -say they can only store mxT for some fixed m and T where m is less than the complexity of the signals 5 and T is finite -the results would still hold qualitatively. Our agent faces two related limitations. First, she interprets ambiguous signals and stores the interpreted signals in memory as if they were observed as interpreted. The agent does this in a "rational" manner, according to their maximum likelihood. As we show below, this will be an optimal storage technique if the agent is faced with making decisions in the short run that depend on how they interpret the situations they face. In addition, she also "forgets" that she has interpreted these signals. If the agent could remember the sequence of dates on which she interpreted signals, then she could undo the memory storage and would end up with the fully rational posterior. 6 It is important that the agent is not able to completely invert the sequence of stored signals: at least some of the interpreted signals are eventually treated as if that was the observed signal. This seems both plausible and consistent with the evidence discussed in Section 4.1.
An Example of Polarized Beliefs
To illustrate this process and the polarization that it induces, let us consider a specific example. For instance, suppose that the true state is ω = A, the probability that an unambiguous signal matches the state is p = 2/3, and the fraction of ambiguous signals is π = 1/2. In such a case, the sequence of signals might look like:
a, ab, ab, b, a, ab, a, ab, ab, b, ab, ab, . . .
In particular, consider a case such that the agent interprets s t = ab based on what is most likely under her current belief λ t−1 : the agent interprets s t = ab as a if λ t−1 > 1/2 and as b if λ t−1 < 1/2.
Suppose that the agent's prior is λ 0 = 3/4. When faced with s 1 = a, the agent's posterior λ 1 becomes 6/7. So, the agent updates beliefs according to Bayes' rule given the interpreted (remembered) signals.
7 Then when seeing s 2 = ab the agent stores the signal as a, and ends 5 See Fryer and Jackson (2008) for discussion of coarse storage of signals. 6 Even if she knew in which way she interpreted signals and how frequently (e.g., knowing that she did it 40 percent of the time and storing ab's as a's) she could undo the effect. 7 In this case λ t = P (A|s t = a, λ t−1 ) = 2λ t−1 /(1 + λ t−1 ), and
up with a posterior of λ 2 = 12/13. In this case, the agent would store the sequence as a, a, a, b, a, a, a, a, a, b, a, a, . . . 
Optimal Interpretations in the Face of Choosing an Action
In the above example, we considered situations where the agent interprets signals according to which state is more likely, which we refer to as maximum likelihood storage. There is a tradeoff: if an agent stores a signal in the way that is viewed as most likely given the current beliefs that can help in reacting to the current situation at hand, but then the agent can bias long-term learning.
To explore this tradeoff, consider a situation in which the agent must take an action based on the current interaction. For instance, in the context of our racist example, at each date the agent must react appropriately to either being faced with a racist or not. 8 In the case of an ambiguous encounter, the agent must take an action. The key assumption is that if the agent decides that it is best to respond to s t = ab at time t in a manner consistent with a signal of a, then the agent must store the signal as an a. The agent cannot treat the signal in one manner for actions and then remember it differently. This is in line with our limited memory assumption.
To be more explicit, suppose the agent has to call out her interpretation a or b of the unclear signal she receives. She gets payoff of u t = 1 if the current situation is correctly identified and u t = 0 when a mistake is made. 9 In particular, if the agent calls out a, then u t = 1 with probability p if the state is A and probability (1 − p) if the state is B. Similarly, if the signal is ambiguous and the agent calls out b, then u t = 1 with probability (1 − p) if the state is A and probability p if the state is B.
To represent the full set of possible strategies that an agent might have for making interpretations (including strategies for agents with unbounded memories), we first define histories. Let a history h t = (s 1 , i 1 ; . . . ; s t , i t ) ∈ {{a, b, ab} × {a, b}} t be a list of raw signals and their interpretations seen through time t. Let H t = {{a, b, ab} × {a, b}} t be all the histories of length t and H = ∪ t H t be the set of all finite histories. A strategy for the agent is a function σ that can depend on the history and the agent's beliefs and generates a probability that the current signal is interpreted as a: σ :
10 In particular, σ(h t−1 , λ 0 ) is the probability that the agent interprets an ambiguous signal s t = ab as a conditional upon the history h t−1 and the initial prior belief λ 0 .
A limited-memory strategy is a strategy that depends only on interpreted and not on raw signals.
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An agent's expected payoffs can be written as:
The optimal strategy in the case of unconstrained memory is that of a fully rational Bayesian. It can be written solely as a function of the posterior belief, as the history that led to the posterior is irrelevant.
Our limited-memory strategies exhibit interesting history dependencies. For instance, a sequence can be reshuffled and will not affect Bayesian updating with unbounded memory. However, with bounded memory, the order of observation becomes important. Seeing a sequence where the a's all appear early tilts the prior towards the state A which then effects the interpretation of ab's towards a's. In contrast, reshuffling a sequence towards having the b's early has the opposite effect. For instance, in our example in Section a, ab, ab, b, a, ab, a, ab, ab, b, ab, ab, was interpreted as a, a, a, b, a, a, a, a, a, b, a, a, . . . by anyone starting with a prior above 1/2. Suppose we reorder that original sequence to be b, b, ab, ab, ab, ab, ab, ab, a, a, ab, a,. With the same prior in favor of A, but sufficiently close to 1/2, the interpretation would instead flip to be b, b, b, b, b, b, b, b, a, a, b, a,, and end up pushing the beliefs towards B. So, the order in which a sequence of signals appear can now be (enormously) consequential.
An optimal limited-memory strategy is one that adjusts the probability of interpreting a signal with the posterior, but appears difficult to derive in a closed form. Nonetheless, we can find strategies that approximate the optimal strategy when the agent is sufficiently patient or impatient. To this aim, we will compare several classes of strategies: (a) the optimal strategy, (b) ones that depend only on the time, and (c) ones that involve randomizing in a simple manner based on the posterior.
In the latter class of strategies, the agent randomizes in interpreting ambiguous signals, but with a fixed probability that leans towards the posterior. Let γ ∈ [0, 1] be a parameter such that the agent follows the posterior with probability γ and goes against the posterior with probability 1 − γ. Under such a strategy, at time t with posterior λ t−1 , the agent interprets the unclear signal as a with probability γ1 λ t−1 ≥.5 + (1 − γ)1 λ t−1 <.5 and b with the remaining probability. 12 We denote this strategy by σ γ .
The special case of γ = 1 corresponds to maximum likelihood interpretation. As we show now, maximum likelihood is an approximately optimal method of interpretation if the agent cares relatively more about the short run than the long run.
Proposition 1 If the agent's discount factor is small enough or the prior belief is close enough to either 0 or 1, then the maximum likelihood strategy is approximately optimal. That is, for any λ 0 and ε > 0, there exist δ such that if δ < δ, then U (σ 1 , δ, λ 0 ) ≥ U (σ, δ, λ 0 )−ε for all strategies σ. Moreover, the same statement holds for any δ for λ 0 that are close enough to 0 or 1.
All proofs appear in the appendix. The intuition is straightforward. The underlying tension is between correctly calling the state in the short run, and interpreting signals over the long run. If the decision maker is sufficiently impatient then it is best to make correct decisions in the short run and not worry about long-run learning. The last part of the proposition shows that even if the agent is very patient, if the agent begins with a strong prior in one direction or the other (λ 0 near either 0 or 1), then maximum likelihood is again optimal as the agent does not expect to learn much.
At the other extreme, by setting γ = 1/2, then it is clear that the agent will learn the state with probability one in the long run. However, that is at the expense of making incorrect decisions at many dates. More generally, we can state the following proposition.
Let us say that there is long-run learning under the randomized-interpretation strategy σ γ for some γ if the resulting beliefs λ t converge to the true state almost surely. then there is a positive probability that beliefs λ t converge to the wrong state under the randomized-interpretation strategy σ γ .
Approximately Optimal Strategies: Two-Step Rules
Proposition 2 shows that long run learning under a randomized-interpretation strategy only occurs if the randomization is sufficiently high (γ is sufficiently low). This can be very costly in the long run, as although the posterior converges, it happens because the agent is randomly interpreting ambiguous signals, even when the agent is almost certain of how they should be interpreted.
The optimal strategy should adjust the randomization with the belief: as the agent becomes increasingly sure of the true state, the agent should become increasingly confident in categorizing ambiguous signals, and use less randomization. The fully optimal strategy is difficult to characterize as it is the solution to an infinitely nested set of dynamic equations and we have not found a closed-form. Nonetheless, we can easily find a strategy that approximates the optimal strategy when the agent is sufficiently patient.
Consider a T -period two-step rule, defined as follows. For T periods the agent uses γ = 1/2, and after T periods the agent uses γ = 1. Let σ T denote such a strategy. We will show that with sufficient patience, such a strategy is approximately optimal. As a strong benchmark, let σ F I denote the full-information strategy, where the agent actually knows whether the state is A or B, and so when seeing ab then always calls a if ω = A (or b if ω = B). In this case, the expected utility is independent of λ 0 and can be written as a function of the strategy and the discount factor alone: U (σ F I , δ). This is a very stringent benchmark as it presumes information that the agent would never know even under the best circumstances. Even so, we can show that a simple two-step rule can approximate this benchmark.
Proposition 3 Sufficiently patient agents can get arbitrarily close to the full information payoff by using a variation on the two-step rule. That is, for any and λ 0 , there exist T and
Thus, with sufficient patience a very simple strategy approaches the full information benchmark.
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Putting these two results together, how a subjective degree of belief should change "rationally" to account for evidence which is open to interpretation depends, in important ways, on how patient a decision maker is. If they are sufficiently patient, a strategy that entails randomization in the presence of unclear evidence for finite time and then following their maximum likelihood estimate thereafter approximates the full information Bayesian outcome.
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In stark contrast, if agents sufficiently discount the future (or, equivalently, don't expect a large number of similar interactions in the future), they interpret ambiguous evidence as the state which has the highest maximum likelihood, given their prior belief. This leads to more informed (and optimal, though possibly mistaken) decisions in the short-run, but the potential of not learning over the longer-run.
An important remark is that we have specified two-step rules in terms of time. An alternative method is to do the following. If an agent's beliefs λ t place at least weight ε on both states (λ t ∈ [ε, 1 − ε]), then randomize with equal probability on interpretations, and otherwise use the maximum likelihood method. This strategy does not require any attention to calendar time, and also will approximate the full information strategy for small enough ε.
Implications for Polarization of Beliefs
As we have already seen in Section 3.1.1, two agents can have very different interpretations of exactly the same events and that can lead them to update differently, and become increasingly polarized in their beliefs. The next result generalizes that observation. . Consider two interpretative agents 1 and 2 who both use the maximum likelihood rule but have differing priors: agent 1's prior is that A is more likely (so 1 has a prior λ 0 > 1/2) and agent 2's prior is that B is more likely (so 2 has a prior λ 0 < 1/2). Let the two agents see exactly the same sequence of signals. With a positive probability that tends to 1 in π the two agents will end up polarized with 1's posterior tending to 1 and 2's posterior tending to 0. With a positive probability tending to 0 in π the two agents will end up with the same (possibly incorrect) posterior tending to either 0 or 1.
The proof is based on the observation that when π = 1 and λ 0 > 1/2, then all signals are interpreted as a under the maximum likelihood storage rule. Moreover, the law of the belief process depends continuously on π. Table 6 summarizes a variety of studies in which identical information given to subjects in a variety of experimental settings resulted in increased polarization of beliefs -individuals expressing more confidence in their initial beliefs. The seminal paper in this literature is Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) , who provided experimental subjects with two articles on the deterrent effects of capital punishment. The first article offered evidence that capital punishment has a deterrent effect on crime, while the second argued there was no relationship. The authors observe both biased assimilation (subjects rate the article reinforcing their viewpoint as more convincing) and polarization (subjects express greater confidence in their original beliefs).
Evidence Consistent with Polarization of Beliefs
Several other studies have produced similar results using opinions of nuclear power (Plous 1991 Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel (2013) provide a recent example relating to political beliefs regarding health care reform. They conduct an experiment to determine if more aggressive media fact-checking can correct the (false) belief that the Affordable Care Act would create "death panels." Participants from an opt-in Internet panel were randomly assigned to either a control group in which they read an article on Sarah Palin's claims about "death panels" or a treatment group in which the article also contained corrective information refuting Palin.
Consistent with the maximum likelihood storage rule, Nyhan, Reifler, and Ubel (2013) find that the treatment reduced belief in death panels and strong opposition to the Affordable Care Act among those who viewed Palin unfavorably and those who view her favorably but have low political knowledge. However, identical information served to strengthen beliefs in death panels among politically knowledgeable Palin supporters.
Conclusion
Polarization of beliefs has been documented by both economists and psychologists. To date, however, there has been little understanding of the underlying mechanisms that lead to such polarization, and especially why increasing polarization occurs even though agents are faced with access to the same information. To fill this void, we illuminate a simple idea: when evidence is open to interpretation, then a straightforward -and constrained optimal -iterative application of Bayes' rule can lead individuals to polarize when their information sets are identical.
As an additional important prediction, it follows directly from our model that agents who are forced to crystalize their beliefs (through deliberate action or social interactions) in the face of signals that are open to interpretation will polarize faster (and in more situations) than those who only infrequently have to react to signals that are open to interpretation. This provides a testable empirical prediction for future experiments.
Beyond polarization, our adaptation of Bayes' rule has potentially important implications for other information-based models such as discrimination. For instance, using our updating rule, it is straightforward to show that statistical discrimination can persists in a world with infinite signals. This is not true in standard models the rely on a single signal (e.g. Coate and Loury 1993). Moreover, policies designed to counteract discrimination likely have to be more complicated in an environment in which employers are forced to interpret unclear signals before hiring decisions are made.
Bayes' rule is one of the most often used results in the applied sciences -expressing how a belief should change, rationally, to account for evidence. In many applications, from economics to ecology, evidence is open to interpretation and our model can be used to form posteriors.
Next, let us now show that it is possible to choose δ such that it approaches 1 as λ 0 approaches 0 or 1. For any δ, there exists T (δ) such that the expected sum of discounted utilities past time T (δ) amounts to less than ε/2 and so the utility is captured in the first T (δ) periods:
Next, note that the expression
is continuous in λ 0 including the extreme points of λ 0 ∈ {0, 1} for any given δ. Note also that σ 1 is the optimal strategy if λ 0 = 1, since then the expected payoff in any given period (independent of the history) is simply the probability that the interpretation is A times p plus the probability that the interpretation is the interpretation is B times 1 − p. This is maximized by setting the interpretation to A. Similarly if If λ 0 = 0 the optimal strategy is to interpret things as B in any given period. Thus, maximum likelihood storage rule, σ 1 , is optimal for λ 0 ∈ {0, 1}. Given the continuity, it is within ε/2 optimal for any λ 0 close enough to 1 or 0. So, for any δ we can find λ 0 close enough to 1 or 0 for which
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first state an auxiliary result, from Hoeffding (1963) , that is useful in proving Proposition 2.
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding's inequality) If X 1 , . . . , X t are independent and a i ≤ X i ≤ b i for i = 1, 2, . . . , t, then for δ > 0,
Let n(λ) be the number of b interpreted signals minus the number of a interpreted signals 15 An upper bound is to set
needed to reach the frontier where λ t = 1/2 starting from λ 0 = λ, i.e.,
The · reflects starting from a prior below 1/2, and otherwise it would be rounded up. The process n t = n(λ t ) is a random walk in the integers such that n t is increased by 1 every time there is an interpreted a signal and decreased by 1 every time there is an interpreted b signal. The conditional laws given the states A and B are denoted by P A and P B , respectively, and E A and E B are the corresponding expectations.
(a) First, note that if (1 − π)p + π(1 − γ) > 1/2 (which is rewritten as γ <
, then even if all of the unclear signals are incorrectly interpreted, the majority of signals will still match the true state. Therefore, if the true state is A, then the increments ∆n t = n t+1 − n t are positive in expectation, i.e., E A (∆n t ) > 0. Moreover, they have bounded first and second moments. It follows from the strong law of large numbers that (n t −E A (n t ))/t converges to zero P A -a.s., which implies that n t → ∞ P A -a.s. and λ t → 1 P A -a.s. The P B -a.s. convergence of λ t to zero is proven in a similar same way.
Note that this is automatically satisfied if π < (p − 1/2)/p for any γ, which establishes the first sentence of the proposition.
(b) Now suppose that (1−π)p+π(1−γ) < 1/2 and assume that the true state is B. We claim that P B assigns positive probability to the event λ t → 1, which coincides with the event n t → ∞. First, we note that n t reaches any preset level with positive probability if t is large enough. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove the proposition for n 0 large. Whenever n t is positive, it is more likely to increase than to decrease, i.e., P B (∆n t = 1) ≡ z > 1/2. As long as this is the case, E B (∆n t ) = 2z − 1 > 0 and Hoeffding's inequality states that for any > 0,
Setting = (2z − 1)/2 leads to the bound
When n 0 is large, n t cannot immediately fall below (z − 1/2)t. More specifically, this is impossible for t ≤ n 0 /(z + 1/2) . It follows that
The last expression is positive if n 0 is large enough. This proves that
It can be shown in a similar way that P A assigns positive probability to the event λ t → 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the limit, the belief process places a.s. weight 1 on the true state of Nature when the γ = 1/2 rule is used, as shown in proposition 2 (and could also be deduced from Levy's 0-1 law and Martingale convergence of beliefs). Therefore, the belief process remains eventually on the correct side of the frontier. Formally, under the γ = 1/2 rule, the random time S = inf{t ≥ 0 : ∀s ≥ t : 1 λt>1/2 = ω} is P ω -a.s. finite for any ω ∈ {A, B}. Therefore, for any T ,
In the above equation, the first relation holds because some non-negative terms are dropped, the second relation holds because the agent calls out the right state past time S, the third relation holds for large enough T because P (S ≤ T ) → 1 as T → ∞, and the fourth relation holds for δ close enough to 1 because then the first T stages do not matter relative to the rest.
Proof of Proposition 4. The argument in the proof of proposition 2b shows that when π < 1, then the values 0 and 1 occur with positive probability as the limit of the belief process λ t as t → ∞. It remains to show that λ t → 1 with probability tending to one as π → 1 if λ 0 > 1/2. So let us assume λ 0 > 1/2. Obviously, in the extreme case that π = 1, all signals are interpreted as a and therefore, the probability that λ t → 1 equals 1. This probability depends continuously on the parameter π by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Under any strategy, the belief process Λ is continuous in the total variation norm with respect to the parameters p and π.
Proof. It is equivalent to show the proposition for the point process n t defined in the proof of Proposition 2 instead of the process λ t . Let p k → p, π k → π, and let P k and P be the corresponding laws of the process n t . Furthermore, let F t be the sigma algebra generated by n 0 , . . . , n t and P k t the restriction of P k to F t . It follows directly from the ChapmanKolmogorov equations or from Jacod and Shiryaev (2003, corollary V.4.39a) applied to the point process (n t − n 0 + t)/2 that the total variation of the signed measure P Experimental subjects were provided with evidence for and against the detterant effect of the death penalty. Subjects of all beliefs report that the article matching their baseline is more convincing, and students became more confident in their original position.
Darley and Gross (1983)
Subjects were asked to grade an identical essay after hearing the child described as from a poor, inner-city neighborhood or a middle-class suburban neighborhood. Subjects gave lower grades to the innercity author, despite no change in the text of the essay. Subjects who viewed a video of the child answering quiz questions before grading the test displayed even greater divergence.
Plous (1991) Subjects with varying opinions on nuclear energy and deterrence were provided with articles on the Three Mile Island disaster and a narrowly-averted accidental missile launch. Subjects of all viewpoints expressed increased confidence in their original viewpoints after reading the articles.
Munro and Ditto (1997)
Subjects with high and low levels of prejudice towards homosexuals were presented with two fictional studies on the empirical prevalence of a homosexual stereotype. Follow-up interviews revealed evidence of both biased assimilation and attitude polarization.
Russo, Meloy, and Medvec (1998) Experimenters sequentially provided subjects with information on two fictional brands. In later stages, once participants have formed preferences, neutral information causes subjects to identify more strongly with their preferred brand.
McHoskey (2002)
Students were randomly selected to review either information supporting the claim that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone in assassinating John F. Kennedy and or information pointing to a larger conspiracy. Students with extreme opinions intensify their positions when presenting with information supporting their beliefs and relax their beliefs to a lesser degree when confronted with contradictory evidence.
Kahan et al (2007)
Subjects were surveyed on their beliefs about the safety of nanotechnology after half were randomly provided with factual information about risks and benefits. Those who were exposed to information displayed greater polarization than those who were not. These studies detail a series of five experiments in which participants are asked to assess the validity of a false or misleading statement by a politician. In each case, the additional information leads the most-committed members of the targeted subgroup to intensify their misperceptions, rather than weakening them.
